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To ergon tou anthropou1
“Ἕκαστόν ἐστιν, ὧν ἐστιν ἔργον, ἕνεκα τοῦ ἔργου.” 
Aristotle, De caelo ii.3, 286a8–9
ABSTRACT: The article offers an interpretation of the so-called ergon argument in 
Aristotle’s nicomachean ethics I.7. I argue that the argument offers a good ground 
for interpreting human happiness as theória and that the argumentation is coherent with 
the rest of the nicomachean ethics as well. The article provides answers to three wide-
spread critiques of the ergon argument. I claim that the ergon argument covers both the 
moral and intellectual virtues, further I offer a possible interpretation of the difference 
between theória of human beings and theória belonging to gods. Finally, I try to explain 
in what sense a good of human being is good for a human being at the same time.
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1. ArisToTle on The ERGON of MAn
Aristotle in the Nicomachean Ethics introduces a more substantial account of hap-
piness by an argument concerning to ergon tou anthropou, i.e., the work or func-
tion of man.2 Many scholars dislike this argument and consider it either falla-
1  The research for this paper was supported by GAcr P401/11/0568. i am thankful to 
audiences in Budapest, Vienna and Prague for their comments upon the draft versions of this 
paper.
2  from the numerous literature on this argument i found the following texts relevant to my 
project: clark (1972), Wilkes (1980), Korsgaard (1986), hutchinson (1986), Whiting (1988), 
Kraut (1989): chap. 6, Broadie (1991): chap. 1, Brüllmann (2011): chap. 3, and Brüllmann 
(2012).
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cious or useless.3 My aim in the following paper is to examine the argument and 
defend it from three possible objections found in modern commentaries.
After going through the possible endoxa concerning eudaimonia as the high-
est good (NE i.3–4), Aristotle provides us with several formal characteristics of 
eudaimonia. We do not know yet what eudaimonia consists in or what kind of 
life one ought to live in order to be happy and good, but whatever it could be, 
eudaimonia as the final goal of every doing and deliberation (praxei kai proairesei 
to telos, 1097a21, cf. a23) will have the following characteristics: it will be com-
plete (teleion, 1097a25) in the sense of being a final good that is not demanded 
for anything else but for itself (auta kai di’ auto airetón, 1097a32–4). further, 
it will be self-sufficient (autarkes, 1097b6–11), so that one does not need any-
thing else but this end. Therefore, “happiness is clearly something complete 
and self-sufficient, being the end of our practical undertakings” (1097b21–22, 
transl. rowe).4
According to Aristotle this is a plain truth and he wants to provide a clearer 
or more distinct (energesteron) account of eudaimonia. What is energesteron is bet-
ter known and somewhat more easily recognisable for us than its counterpart 
(cf. Anal. Prior. 68b36, Magna Mor. 1187a30). Therefore, the following account 
should make more lucid what eudaimonia is and what it consists in. The best 
way to clarify the concept of eudaimonia is to consider the ergon of human beings 
(1098a24–25).
The term ergon is usually translated as “function” (irwin, rowe, ross/Brown) 
or “characteristic activity” (crisp).5 none of these alternatives is completely ap-
pealing to me, for – as will be clear from what follows – ergon does not have to 
be an activity and it is not a function in the most common meaning of the term. 
Another possible translation might be “product,”6 however, this term is not fully 
adequate either since it suggests certain separation between the product and 
producer (e.g. between us as individual human beings and our own ergon). The 
human ergon is much closer or even intimate to us than any product we other-
wise produce. The Greek-English Lexicon by h. G. liddell and r. scott offers 
translations like “work,” “deed,” or “matter.” on the other hand, Aristotle’s us-
age of the term corresponds to the third meaning of “function” in Oxford English 
Dictionary: “the special kind of activity proper to anything; the mode of action 
by which it fulfills its purpose.” This meaning seems so Aristotelian that i will 
3  for the list of complaints see Achtenberg (1989. 37).
4  see curzer (1990) on the criteria for happiness.
5  Kenny (1992. 144–5) leaves the term untranslated throughout his translation of this chap-
ter. The most common translation as “function” is sometimes unfortunate since it may mis-
lead the reader into thinking that ergon is merely a predominant activity (cf. Barney 2008. 
314–315); ergon can be understood as “task” or “deed” as well, since it sometimes refers to the 
object done and not the activity of doing, cf. the argument in the Eudemian Ethics ii.1.
6  suggested to me by Gábor Betegh.
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use “function” when it is inappropriate to keep the transliteration of the Greek 
term.7
in the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle leaves the term without closer specifica-
tion or definition, but his following reasoning tells us enough to determine what 
he has in mind. Ergon comes complementing praxis (doing), and according to Ar-
istotle, ergon rather than praxis is the seat of the good. Aristotle reasons further:
is it the case that there are some doings and functions for a carpenter or a shoe-
maker, but not for a human being, who is born without anything to do (ἀργός)? 
or just as an eye, hand and foot or any of the bodily parts seem to have a function, 
similarly there could be given some function for a human being alongside with 
these? What would it be? (1097b30–33)
Aristotle does not present the argument that a human being has an ergon in a 
logical form; the above quoted passage is not a case of valid induction nor it is 
an argument from analogy. The examples are too few to make a valid induction, 
and they are clearly picked only from two categories (technai or occupations, and 
merei, bodily parts), further, there is no clear analogy between the examples and 
a human being.8
The text is quite persuasive despite the lack of rigid argumentation. its force 
lies exactly in the nature of the two categories of examples indicated as entities 
having their products. There are two uncontroversial truths in the text: different 
occupations have their erga and bodily parts have their erga as well. Therefore, 
a human being is composed of parts, each part having its ergon in relation to the 
complex whole, i.e., to the human being.9 Moreover, any occupation, or social 
and family status one holds has its ergon as well. i am composed of functional 
elements, and since i am, for example, a son, a father, and a lecturer, i always 
partake in family and social positions having their erga (cf. 1097b11). Aristotle 
thus suggests that it would be extremely unlikely if a being that is virtually sur-
rounded by erga, products, would not have a product on its own.
7  Aristotle, PA 639b19–21 might be a place where the term “function” works smoothly.
8  cf. Broadie (1991. 34) for this criticism. nevertheless, the analogies with bodily parts and 
crafts might play a certain role. none of them is a perfectly fitting analogy, but each of them 
has different reasons for not working entirely, which might be important in understanding 
the concept of ergon. An important aspect that would deserve an entire study on its own is the 
fact that both technai and merei have their erga in relation to a broader, complex entity: the polis 
and the living body. The same seems to hold in the case of human beings as well, namely, 
ergon of a man makes sense in relation to a broader complex entity of the polis, cf. Aristotle, 
Pol. i.2, 1253a33–35.
9  clark (1972. 272) points out that according to Aristotle the organs have functions (erga) only 
in relation to a given whole or as parts of this whole, cf. Aristotle, Metaph. Vii.10, 1035b23.
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At this point Aristotle seems to suppose that the case for a human ergon has 
been made sufficiently. The only specification of ergon within this passage is 
that it is something “own” or “peculiar” (idion) to the entity whose ergon it is 
(1097b34). We learn more from the Eudemian Ethics ii.1 where Aristotle dis-
cusses ergon in the same context,10 and a brief look into this text might help in 
understanding why Aristotle thinks it is not necessary to argue for the existence 
of human ergon:
let this be assumed; and about excellence (ἀρετῆς), that it is the best disposition, 
state or capacity of anything that has some employment or function (τις χρῆσις 
ἢ ἔργον). This is evident from induction (ἐπαγωγῆς): in all case this is what we 
suppose. for example, a cloak has an excellence – and a certain function and em-
ployment also; and the best state of the cloak is its excellence. similarly too with 
a boat, a house, and other things. so the same is true also of the soul; for there is 
something which is its function. (ee ii.1, 1218b37–1219a5, transl. Woods).11
Ergon is described in two ways (dichós). it is either distinct from the employment 
(chrésis) as a house is a product of house-building, or in some cases the employ-
ment itself is the product (hé chrésis ergon) as it is in the case of sight or math-
ematical knowledge (EE ii.1, 1219a13–17).12 The text of EE continues:
for example, a shoe is the product of the art of shoe-making and the activity of 
shoe-making. so if there is some excellence which is the excellence (ἀρετὴ) of 
shoe-making and of a good (σπουδαίου) shoe-maker, their product is a good shoe. 
(ee ii.1, 1219a20–23; transl. Woods, slightly adapted)
from the usage of ergon in NE and EE it can be safely assumed that Aristo-
tle employs the same concept of relation between areté and ergon which Plato 
introduces in the end of the first book of the Republic. There Thrasymachus 
refuses to participate in the discussion and leaves the reasoning solely to socra-
tes himself. his first attempt to investigate “whether just people also live better 
and are happier than unjust ones” (Resp. i, 352d2–4, transl. Grube, rev. reeve) 
soon turns to the discussion of ergon. The ergon of an entity is described as “that 
which one can do only with it or best with it” (352e3) and a bit later in the text 
as what the given entity “alone can do or what it does better than anything else” 
10  see hutchinson (1986) for a detailed interpretation of the ergon argument in the Eudemian 
Ethics ii.1 as well as for the justification of interpreting it together with NE.
11  compare the closing chapter of the Meteorology iV.12, 390a10–13: “What a thing is 
is always determined by its function (ergon): a thing really is itself when it can perform its 
function; an eye, for instance, when it can see.” (transl. Webster)
12  This is one of the passages which questions the translation of ergon as “function” since a 
house is hardly a function in any sense of the word.
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(353a10–11). According to socrates a virtue (areté) is a quality by which one per-
forms one’s ergon well (353c6–7).13 Aristotle shares the basic scheme that ergon 
is something own or peculiar (idion) to an entity and we correctly talk about an 
excellence or virtue of this entity if it performs its ergon well. Therefore, in the 
Nicomachean Ethics i.7 Aristotle can suppose that the listeners (or readers) are 
familiar with this concept of ergon within the ethical discussions and does not 
need to argue for it in the first place.
When asked about the ergon of a human being as such (not a man qua shoe-
maker or father), one could answer that this ergon must be one’s life. Aristotle 
proceeds in this way, but narrows the possible answers down to a practical life of 
an entity possessing reason (praktiké tis tou logon echontos, 1098a3-4) since neither 
vegetative life nor life based on perception is idion to a human being, but they 
are shared with plants and animals (1097b33–1098a3).14 Possession of reason is 
expressed in two ways: as obedience to reason (epipeithes logói), and as actually 
having reason and thinking (echon kai dianooumenon, 1098a4–5). Therefore in 
defining human ergon, one has to consider the activity (energeia) since it is more 
valuable than passive obedience.
This focus on energeia manifests itself in the wordings of human ergon by Ar-
istotle. The first version is the conclusion of the reflections on different forms 
of life sketched above: “the product of human being is activity (energeia) of the 
soul according to reason or not without reason.”15 The soul is the subject since 
it is what makes one alive (EE ii.1, 1219a23–25; cf. DA ii.1, 412a27–29) and it 
is the eidos of a living being (DA ii.1, 412b10 ff.), therefore it can be said that 
human ergon is an activity of one’s soul, since the soul is the eidos of man. The 
second wording of human ergon employs the notion of praxis which reflects the 
discussion about the particular doings of a kitharist. The kind of life Aristotle 
looks for can be summarised as “an activity of soul and doings accompanied with 
reason.”16 A virtuous man is the one who does this well, in accordance with the 
concept of ergon sketched above, and thus leads a good life.17 Aristotle supports 
this conclusion by an analogy: the ergon of a kitharist is to play, the virtuous kith-
arist plays well, similarly, if the ergon of human being is the life described above, 
the virtuous man lives this live in a good and beautiful manner 1729864278 (eu 
13  for the usage of ergon later in the Republic see santas (2006). several interpreters confirm 
Aristotle’s inspiration in Plato’s Republic as well, e.g. Barney (2008. 315 ff.), hutchinson (1986. 
46–48).
14  in the Politics i.2 1253a8–1253a18 Aristotle lists further characteristics which are idion to 
man: articulated speech (logos) and sense of good and bad which allows him to live in societies 
or communities. These characteristics do not threaten the coherence of ergon argument in NE 
i.7 since they are both derived from the fact that man is endowed with reason.
15  NE i.7, 1098a7–8: ἐστὶν ἔργον ἀνθρώπου ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια κατὰ λόγον ἢ μὴ ἄνευ 
λόγου.
16  NE i.7, 1098a13–14: ψυχῆς ἐνέργειαν καὶ πράξεις μετὰ λόγου.
17  cf. Plato, Gorgias 507b-c for a similarly shaped argument in favor of a just life.
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kai kalós, 1098a14–15). The description of this human good then uses the term 
areté already: “human good is an activity of soul in accordance with virtue.”18 
This is the case since Aristotle accepts Plato’s concept from the Republic i that 
we do well by the virtue or because of the virtue.19
human good was defined (perigraphó) but it is still only sketched (hupotupoó), 
so that we have a clearer conception of what Aristotle talks about, and he pro-
ceeds to describe it (anagrafó) in more details (1098a20–22). This description 
then fills the rest of the Nicomachean Ethics and climaxes in book ten, where Ar-
istotle mentions again that human good, eudaimonia, is “an activity in accordance 
with virtue” (kat’ aretén energeia, 1177a12 ). The best activity we are capable of 
is contemplation (theória, 1177a18). so Aristotle returns to the activity of reason 
which he mentioned in book one during the argumentation about ergon (1098a4–
5 compare with 1177a13–17), and declares that eudaimonia is theória (1178b32). 
This conclusion should not surprise us since theória as the highest form of activi-
ty of a wise man (or of a reason of a wise man) satisfies all the conditions Aristotle 
sets for human good in book one. A wise person is the most self-sufficient one 
(autarkestatos, 1177b1, cf. 1097b6-11 ), contemplation is demanded for its own 
sake and does not have any other goal (1177b4 ff, 1177b19–21, cf. 1097a32–4), 
and therefore can be considered more complete (teleion) than life consisting in 
other doings (1178b1 ff.).20 finally, it is the activity of reason that satisfies the 
condition of being peculiar or one’s own at the highest level:
And each of us would seem actually to be this (sc. reason),21 given that each is his 
authoritative and better element; it would be strange thing, then if one chose not 
one’s own life but that of something else. Again, what was said before will fit with the 
present case too: what belongs to each kind of creature is best and most pleasant for 
each;22 for man, then, the life in accordance with intelligence is so too, given that man 
is this most of all. This life, then, will be happiest. (1178a2–8; transl. rowe)
The life of contemplation thus satisfies all the conditions of eudaimonia which 
Aristotle mentions earlier in the Nicomachean Ethics.23
18  NE i.7, 1098a16–17: τὸ ἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθὸν ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια γίνεται κατ’ ἀρετήν.
19  see the dative ἀρετῇ in Plato, Resp. i, 353c6 which suggests that we accomplish 
something by means of the virtue.
20  curzer (1990) argues that the criteria for happiness in NE i.7 differ from NE X.6–8. his 
text clarifies several important points, but overall it rests on too elaborate and not absolutely 
convincing interpretations.
21  The term nous has to be supplied from 1177b30. Meanwhile it is referred to as “the 
strongest among the things in us” (1177b34).
22  This important part of the argument was mentioned earlier in book nine (1169b33) and 
it comes from Plato’s Republic iX, 585d–e and 586d; Adam (1963), vol. ii, p. 358 points out 
this dependence.
23  What remains an open question is the relation between the life based on moral (and 
social) virtues on the one hand, and contemplative life based on intellectual virtues on the 
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2. oBJecTions
i tried to present Aristotle’s notion of to ergon tou anthropou as convincingly as 
possible. now i will turn to three objections against this conception of construct-
ing human eudaimonia as a final goal of life based on human ergon. The cho-
sen objections occur repeatedly in modern interpretations and their proponents 
consider them so crucial as to undermine Aristotle’s position. According to the 
first objection, the ergon argument is useless within the overall argumentative 
structure of the NE since Aristotle actually depicts not one but two morally sat-
isfying lives: the life of moral virtues described in the central books of NE and 
the contemplative life sketched in book ten. since in NE X.7–8 Aristotle clearly 
argues for the superiority of contemplative life, the ergon argument plays only 
a minor role in introducing the moral virtues and Aristotle leaves it aside in the 
crucial and concluding book X.24
The second objection runs as follows: even if one admits that the ergon ar-
gument is coherent with conclusions in NE X.7–8, the ergon Aristotle states as 
fitting for man does not satisfy his own conditions for being ergon since (a) it is 
not unique (idion) – not only men, but also and foremost the gods contemplate 
and enjoy the activity of reason.25 Moreover, (b) there are many other activities 
or doings peculiar to human beings which Aristotle does not suggest and does 
not discuss.26
finally, the third objection claims that the good of a human being does not 
have to be a good for a human being.27 namely, if justice is an excellence or vir-
tue of human character, it characterises a good life of a human being. however, 
a just man might suffer because of his own justice. in the same way, sharpness is 
a good or virtue of a knife, but it is hard to see how it is good for a knife.
3. The firsT rePlY
is it indeed the case that Aristotle uses the ergon argument solely in order to ar-
rive at describing moral life based on the so-called moral virtues (éthiké areté)28 
and leaves it behind in book ten? or to put it another way, is Aristotle guilty of 
introducing theória as eudaimonia in book ten despite and against the methodol-
ogy and argument in the rest of the Nicomachean Ethics? The possible answer 
other hand. however, this question demands another substantial investigation, for the current 
state of debate, see the summary in dahl (2011).
24  roche (1988. 183). This objection is entertained in Korsgaard (1986. 260) as well.
25  Kraut (1979).
26  Broadie (1991. 36); Whiting (1988. 36–38); Williams (1972. 59).
27  Wilkes (1980).
28  on éthiké areté cf. ΝE ΙΙ.1 1103a14, ii.9 1109a20, Vi.2 1139a22; Vi.12 1144a7.
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has two parts. first, i will show that Aristotle does not leave the ergon argument 
behind and the conclusion within book ten corresponds to the principles laid 
out within the ergon argument in book one. second, it can be demonstrated that 
Aristotle reflects on the relation between contemplative and practical life in the 
middle books of the Nicomachean Ethics in a way which helps us in understand-
ing the relation between moral virtues and contemplative virtues.
indeed, it is the case that the term ergon is missing from the crucial chapters 
on the contemplative life (X.7–8), however, it plays an important role in Aristo-
tle’s discussion of pleasure in chapter five of book ten. Aristotle uses an example 
of different erga in order to support his thesis that “activity’s own pleasure (oikeia 
hedoné) contributes to increasing the activity” (1175a30–31). each man takes 
pleasure doing his own ergon rather than the ergon of anyone else; each one gets 
better in his own activity due to pleasure he finds in it, and this pleasure is said 
to “increase” (sunauxanó) this activity as something which is own to it (1175a31–
b1). This argument then leads Aristotle to a general conclusion that: “each kind 
of creature seems to have its own kind of pleasure, just as it has its own ergon, for 
the pleasure corresponding to its activity will be its own” (1176a3–5).
Moreover, Aristotle refers to this thesis that each one gets most pleasure from 
doing what is his or her own in the conclusion concerning the contemplative life 
as the happiest life. once again, let me quote:
Again, what was said before will fit with the present case too: what belongs to each 
kind of creature is best and most pleasant for each; for man, then, the life in accord-
ance with intelligence is so too, given that man is this most of all. This life, then, 
will be happiest. (1178a4–8).
The reference is to chapter five interpreted above. The quoted passage suggests 
that contemplative life is the ergon of a human being.29 This is the answer to the 
question of what sort of life satisfies the description of “an activity of soul in ac-
cordance with virtue (and if there are more virtue than one, in accordance with 
the best and the most complete)” (1098a16–18).
second, this interpretation is supported by Aristotle’s own reflection on the 
relation between the contemplative life on the one hand, and the so-called life 
of moral virtues on the other hand. Within the discussion of intellectual virtues 
in book six, Aristotle compares phronésis (reasonableness) and sophia (wisdom) 
on two occasions (1141a18–22, 1143b33–35). These comparisons have the same 
results: wisdom is above reasonableness since its objects belong to the greatest 
and most valuable ones within the cosmos (tón timiótatón, 1141a19–20), and wise 
people (sophoi) have knowledge concerning archai (1141a18). Moreover, wisdom 
29  of course much depends on the understanding of life (bios), see Keyt (1989) for one 
possible interpretation.
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is said to rule over and command reasonableness since it either creates reasona-
bleness itself or supplies it with material to work on.30
Aristotle claims that despite this comparison, both virtues, phronésis and 
sophia, are desirable by themselves since they each belong to a different part 
of the soul (1144a1–3). This means that both satisfy an important condition for 
making up eudaimonia (cf.1097a32–4), and they cannot be substituted. Aristotle 
then describes what these virtues do (poiein). he proceeds through all four parts 
of the soul which he distinguished earlier in NE i.12 and Vi.2,31 and lists what 
they do (except the fourth, vegetative part since it cannot be said doing or not 
doing anything at all). Aristotle explicitly states that wisdom produces eudaimo-
nia in the soul (1144a4–5).32 Phronésis and moral virtues contribute to fulfilling 
the ergon of man: virtue is responsible for having the right goal (skopos) and rea-
sonableness for the right means leading to it (1144a7–9). Therefore, contempla-
tive life seems unquestionably higher than life of moral virtues; however, these 
virtues and reasonableness are necessary though not sufficient components of 
eudaimonia since without them one could not fulfil one’s own ergon.33
30  The sentence runs as follows: πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἄτοπον ἂν εἶναι δόξειεν, εἰ χείρων 
τῆς σοφίας οὖσα κυριωτέρα αὐτῆς ἔσται· ἡ γὰρ ποιοῦσα ἄρχει καὶ ἐπιτάττει περὶ 
ἕκαστον (1143b33–35). The explicative gar clause is puzzling and translators to do not agree 
on its meaning. crisp translates it as “in addition, given that a productive science does gov-
ern each product and issue commands about it, it will seem odd if practical wisdom, which 
is inferior to wisdom, is to be put in control of it.” This is the only occurrence of the term 
“productive science” in crisp’s translation. he uses “productive” for poiétiké (e.g. 1139a28, 
b1, 1140a4) and “science” for epistémé (e.g. 1094a26, b4–5). Therefore the phrase “productive 
science” should stand for something like poiétiké epistémé which does not occur anywhere in 
ne (moreover, none of the terms occurs in proximity to this passage; for poiétiké epistémé see 
EE 1216b11ff., Met. 1025b25ff., 1064a17ff.). Brown ross renders it as “Besides this, it would 
be thought strange if practical wisdom, being inferior to philosophic wisdom, is to be put in 
authority over it, as seems to be implied by the fact that the art which produces anything rules 
and issues commands about that thing.” This translation seems much better, yet it is unclear 
why it includes “the art” in the translation of the second clause. rowe’s translation: “in ad-
dition to these problems, it would be strange if wisdom (phronésis) turned out to be inferior to 
intellectual accomplishment (sophia), yet be more authoritative – as it apparently will be, for 
the one that brings the other about will be in control and prescribe on everything.” stewart 
(1892) vol 2. 97 reads the clause so that sophia supplies material for phronésis.
31  The contextual division of the soul in NE seems to be based on three bipartitions; first, 
two parts are distinguished in the soul: reasonless one (alogon) and reason-having one (logon 
echon) at 1102a28. The former one is further divided into the vegetative part and a part that 
shares in reason or at least it can obey it (1102b11 ff.). The reason-having one is then separated 
again into two parts; once at i.13, 1103a1 ff. and this division is confirmed and elaborated at 
Vi.2 1139a4 ff. one subsection of the reason-having part deals with necessary objects and 
connections, the other with all the entities that undergo change, generation and corruption.
32  it is said that sophia produces eudaimonia not as a physician produces health but as health 
produces good state in the body; stewart (1894) vol. 2, p. 98 comments extensively on the 
analogy with health and its implications.
33  compare NE X.7 1177a27ff. on autarkeia in relation to intellectual and moral virtues.
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4. The second rePlY
The second objection had two parts. According to the latter, Aristotle neglects 
various specific doings of man. This can be answered with some help from his 
explicitly stated methodology.34 When Williams criticises Aristotle’s interpreta-
tion since it arbitrarily chooses one peculiar doing of man without discussing 
other options, he writes:
if one approached without preconceptions the question of finding characteristics 
which differentiate men from other animals, one could as well, on these principles, 
end up with a morality which exhorted men to spend as much time as possible 
in making fire; or developing peculiarly human physical characteristics; or having 
sexual intercourse without regard to season; or despoiling the environment and 
upsetting the balance of nature; or killing things for fun. (Williams 1972. 59)35
let us accept that these characteristics are peculiar to man and they do not de-
pend upon the fact of our rationality. nonetheless, Aristotle has a fairly reason-
able reply: all these suggestions are absurd and unconvincing as an ethical ideal. 
This is enough to reject them from a serious inquiry. When Aristotle reflects 
upon his methodology in the Nicomachean Ethics, he makes it clear that he is 
not obliged to go through all logically possible options. first, the study of eth-
ics does not allow the same degree of precision as, for example, mathematics or 
metaphysics (1094b19–27). second, and more importantly, it only takes most 
of the credible opinions (endoxa), and the most important ones (ta pleista kai 
kuriótata, 1145b2–7) into consideration.36 Therefore, Aristotle is not obliged in 
examining all peculiarities of a human being. Anyone suggesting, for example, 
making fire as a human ergon to ground human eudaimonia should first sincerely 
experience a life based on such an ergon before making this claim.
The variety of different peculiarities of a human being does not threaten Ar-
istotle’s argument. But what about the fact that on the one hand, he claims that 
ergon must be something idion (1097b34) and then identifies eudaimonia with 
theória (1178b32) which is rather a life for gods than humans (1178b25 ff.)?37 Ar-
istotle uses the term idion in order to reject the plain fact of living (zén) as human 
ergon since it is common to everything alive including plants, further, he also 
excludes the life based on sensation since it is common to all animals (1097b33–
1098a3). Therefore, when looking for human ergon that is idion, he ends up with 
a complex form of “practical life of an entity that possesses reason” (praktiké tis 
34  extremely useful article is Barnes (1980).
35  Broadie (1991. 36) lists different characteristics but her argument is the same one.
36  compare Aristotle’s position in EE, i,3 1214b28–1215a3.
37  see Kraut (1979) and (1989), chap. 6.1. on the term theória see extremely useful 
roochnik (2009).
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tou logon echontos, 1098a3–4). This complex form of life is indeed idion to a hu-
man being since gods relate to contemplation (theória) in a different way and 
their form of life cannot be called practical (praktiké) because it is not based on 
any doing (praxis). Aristotle considers contemplation as one possible kind of 
human doing38 and nothing human can last in its activity without interruption 
(1175a4–5). on the other hand, gods do not do anything since no doing (praxis) 
can be worthy of them (1178b17–18). The gods are active in the sense of energeia 
not praxis and their activity is contemplation.39 indeed, the god is this energeia 
and therefore he is constantly happy.40
Therefore, the ergon that is idion to human beings demands phronésis, reasona-
bleness, in order to be achieved (1144a7–9) since it includes doings (praxeis); 
it is, after all “an activity of soul and doings accompanied with reason”.41 if we 
remain satisfied with moral virtues, Aristotle says, we live the second best life 
(1178a9–14) since eudaimonia consists in theória (1178b32). But whereas the god’s 
life is blessed in its entirety, our life only in so far as there is some similarity with 
the god’s activity (energeia). To put it into a nutshell, while for us contemplation 
is something we do (time to time), for the god it is what it actually is.42 human 
beings can only be similar to god since in the moments of theória they share in 
the same energeia that constitutes the essence of god. Within these (perhaps rare) 
moments we, humans, are god-like but our life nevertheless essentially differs 
from god’s mode of existence.
38  cf. Aristotle, Politics, Vii.3 1325b16–21: “Yet it is not necessary, as some suppose, for a 
life of action to involve relations with other people, nor are those thoughts alone active which 
we engage in for the sake of action’s consequences; the study and thought that are their own 
ends and are engaged in for their own sake are much more so. for to do or act well is the end, 
so that action of a sort is the end too” (transl. reeve).
39  NE X.8 1178b21–22: ὥστε ἡ τοῦ θεοῦ ἐνέργεια, μακαριότητι διαφέρουσα, θεωρητικὴ 
ἂν εἴη· Aristotle never mentions praxis in relation to the god or gods; he consistently uses 
energeia. cf. Grant (1885), vol. 1, p. 236. 
40  on god as energeia see Met. Xii.7, 1072b26–28: καὶ ζωὴ δέ γε ὑπάρχει· ἡ γὰρ νοῦ 
ἐνέργεια ζωή, ἐκεῖνος δὲ ἡ ἐνέργεια· ἐνέργεια δὲ ἡ καθ’ αὑτὴν ἐκείνου ζωὴ ἀρίστη 
καὶ ἀΐδιος. few lines earlier it says that god’s energeia is his hédoné as well (ἡδονὴ ἡ ἐνέργεια 
τούτου, Met. Xii.7 1072b16) and in NE iX.4 1166a21–23 Aristotle says that god has the 
good solely in virtue of what god is (ἔχει γὰρ καὶ νῦν ὁ θεὸς τἀγαθόν ἀλλ’ ὢν ὅ τι ποτ’ 
ἐστίν).
41  NE i.7, 1098a13–14: ψυχῆς ἐνέργειαν καὶ πράξεις μετὰ λόγου.
42  Wilkes (1980. 345) writes “the gods do nothing else,” this is not correct, the gods do not 
do anything, they are the energeia of contemplation.
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5. The Third rePlY
i have suggested possible answers to two objections, according to the third one, 
the good of a human being that is determined by the ergon argument does not 
have to be a good for a human being.43 The ergon argument established that the 
good of a human being consists in “human good is an activity of soul in accord-
ance with virtue” (1098a16–17). now we ask whether it is the case that these 
virtues are good for this human being. it is a crucial question since it exposes 
Aristotle’s ethical theory to an amoralist challenge.44 The question is not only 
whether a corrupt society can threaten eudaimonia of a just and moral person 
since it is unclear whether one can gain any moral virtues while living in a cor-
rupt society in the first place (1179b31 ff.). This question aims at justification of 
Aristotle’s morality to someone who does not accept its basic premises. When 
talking about the human good (anthrópinos agathos, NE 1094b7, 1098a7, 1102a14, 
1140b5 atd.), Aristotle presupposes that the good of man is at the same time 
good for man since nothing that is not his own can be good for him. Yet, what 
can Aristotle answer if someone questions this very assumption?
Aristotle could proceed in two steps. The first attempt might be to appeal to 
a naturally hedonistic point of view since no one would disprove that pleasure 
coming from one’s own doing is good for a human being (not the highest good, 
of course, but simple good since we enjoy it). Aristotle might introduce his basic 
principle that what is one’s own is enjoyable in itself (1169b33). And pleasure is 
essentially connected with activity (energeia) it makes complete:
for the activity’s own pleasure contributes to increasing the activity. it is those 
who are active and take pleasure in it that are more discriminating and precise in 
relation to a given subject, e.g. those who delight in geometry are the ones that be-
come expert in geometry, and are always more able to see things, and similarly the 
lover of music, or of buildings, or whatever it may be – each gets better at his own 
task through taking pleasure in it; but what contributes to increasing something 
belongs to it as its own. (1175a29–36; transl. rowe)
When applied to a human being that is foremost nous, reason (1169a2–3, 1178a2, 
1178a7), the result is that human being not only reaches eudaimonia when con-
templating, but it brings him the highest pleasure as well.45
43  This challenge actually mirrors Glaucon’s problem with justice in the second book of 
Plato’s Republic, 360d-361d.
44  on the amoralist, see Williams (1972. 3–13); Williams (1985. 22–29) and raz (2002), 
chap. 12.
45  cf. NE 1175a19–21: “As for whether we choose living because we want pleasure or 
pleasure because we want to be alive, this is something that may be set aside for the present; 
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What if this answer to an amoralist fails since either he rejects the relation 
between pleasure and activity or he disapproves of Aristotle’s principle linking 
what is one’s own with pleasure and eudaimonia? Aristotle considers both the 
relation between pleasure and activity on the one hand, and the principle that 
what is one’s own is highly pleasurable on the other hand, as basic principles de-
rived from experience (cf. his argumentation at 1104b3ff., 1169b30ff., and X.4-5 
from which i quoted above). The only possible answer to someone who denies 
so basic principles seems to be: go and try. That is why in the Nicomachean Eth-
ics Aristotle says that sufficient experience in doings of life  (tón kata ton bion 
praxeón) is a necessary precondition for a reasonable discourse on moral philoso-
phy (1095a1–13). And he is even more explicit in the Eudemian Ethics: “only 
the opinions of reasonable men should be examined; it would be strange to 
present argument to those who need not argument, but experience (pathous)” 
(EE, 1215a2–3; transl. Woods).46
6. conclusion
i offered a defense of Aristotle’s ergon argument in the first book of Nicomachean 
Ethics from three objections to its coherence and integrity within the overall 
argumentative structure of the NE. in my reading the ergon argument plays a 
crucial role in Aristotle’s moral theory since it allows him to model his theory of 
virtue upon a much broader (and common-sense) notion of excellence as being 
good within one’s own ergon. The result might be frustrating for many inter-
preters since Aristotle argues for a life of contemplation as providing eudaimo-
nia. however, i argued that the moral virtues and reasonableness constitute a 
necessary part of a fully human life; it is this complexity of human life (with 
contemplation as its climax) that best satisfies human ergon. Aristotle’s approach 
is humanistic in the sense that his moral theory rests upon what it means to live 
a human life. nevertheless, it is not humanistic in the sense that human beings 
are not the most (or even the only) valuable entities in the universe. According 
to Aristotle: “in fact there are other things that have a far diviner nature than a 
human being” (1141a34–b1). This seems to be the reason why Aristotle cannot 
be satisfied with a merely mortal, human way of life as an ethical goal.
further, if we take the ergon argument seriously (both in Plato and Aristotle), 
it shows how different this kind of ethics is compared to its modern counterparts 
influenced by hume and Kant. The move from describing human life based on 
for the two things appear to be yoked together, and not to allow themselves to be separated” 
(transl. rowe).
46  Aristotle in the Politics uses the same approach towards those who are mistaken concerning 
the importance of virtue: “We, however, will say to them that it is easy to reach a reliable 
conclusion on these matters even from the facts themselves.” (Polit. Vii.1, 1323a38–40).
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human eidos leads us to the excellence and notion of good human life in a way 
that shows the humean distinction between descriptive and normative to be 
completely anachronistic in this respect.47 surely, it is the case that the term 
eidos is “already normative” in certain contexts (especially in ethics). Moreover, 
one might have problems with accepting that human nature shares in divine or, 
to put it differently, that there is a bit of divine in us. however, these aspects of 
Aristotle’s moral theory do not threaten the main aim of the argument that is still 
interesting and important: to achieve an account of human virtue and good life 
based on what it means to be a human being.
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